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rganizations downsize for two basic 
reasons. The first reason is to re-
duce costs in response to a financial 
crisis such as a recession (Zatzick, 
Marks, & Iverson, 2009). The sec-
ond reason is to improve long-term competi-
tive advantage “by improving efficiencies, 
taking advantage of new technologies, chang-
ing the skills of the workforce, or restructuring 
the organization” (Zatzick et al., 2009, p. 80). 
In both types of downsizing, the ultimate goal 
is to improve organizational performance 
through the strategy of workforce reduction. 
However, research results are mixed as to 
whether downsizing through workforce reduc-
tion improves performance (e.g., Cascio, 2002; 
Datta, Guthrie, Basuil, & Pandey, 2010; Guthrie 
& Datta, 2008; Marks, 2006). Researchers gen-
erally believe that declines in employee morale 
caused by these reductions often result in 
performance declines (Cascio, 2002; Mishra, 
Spreitzer, & Mishra, 1998). These declines in 
employee morale manifest themselves in a vari-
ety of ways. For example, turnover increases 
because of downsizing (Iverson & Zatzick, 2011; 
Trevor & Nyberg, 2008). Also, some surviv-
ing employees feel guilt, fear, or anger, which 
impacts their productivity (Brockner, 1988, 
1992; Iverson & Zatzick, 2011; Marks, 2006). 
Customer satisfaction and loyalty also decrease 
after downsizing (Lewin, 2003, 2009; Williams, 
Khan, & Naumann, 2011). On the other hand, 
some studies indicate that downsizing is asso-
ciated with increased profits (Palmon, Sun, & 
Tang, 1997), return on assets (Cascio, Young, 
& Morris, 1997; Palmon et al., 1997), asset 
turnover, return on equity (Espahbodi, John, 
& Vasudevan, 2000), and operating income to 
total assets (Yu & Park, 2006). 
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Appelbaum, Patton, and Shapiro (2003) 
maintain that successful downsizing attempts 
are differentiated from unsuccessful ones 
by the presence of a strategic approach. From 
this perspective, studies have highlighted 
the importance of adopting best practices to 
reduce the negative effects associated with 
downsizing (e.g., Brockner, 1992; Feldman, 
1994; Mishra et al., 1998; Zatzick et al., 2009). 
Best practices include cutting costs without 
forced workforce reductions, pro-
viding accurate and honest infor-
mation through communications, 
giving employees opportunities 
to provide feedback, and creat-
ing a fair and compassionate work 
environment (Zatzick et al., 2009). 
Of particular importance to this 
study is the best practice of work-
force reduction without compul-
sory layoffs.
A common method to reduce 
the workforce without forced 
layoffs is to institute a variety of 
severance options, such as early-
retirement programs and buyouts 
(Muñoz-Bullón & Sánchez-Bueno, 
2010; Zatzick et al., 2009). An 
appropriate mix of these options, 
one that takes into account 
the composition of the work-
force, allows an organization to 
downsize without the necessity 
of forced layoffs. Such a mix is 
important because the organiza-
tion is better able to preserve its 
knowledge base through retaining 
senior employees while protecting 
the future talent base represented by employ-
ees with less experience (Cascio & Wynn, 
2004). In order for an organization to create 
an appropriate mix of options, it must under-
stand the characteristics of those individuals 
who are likely to accept each of the options 
as well as the characteristics of those who are 
likely to reject each of the options. 
Although there has been research on sev-
erance programs that offer incentives to quit 
the organization, this research primarily has 
focused on the characteristics of those indi-
viduals who are either retirement eligible 
or close to retirement eligible (e.g., Gowan, 
1998; Hogarth, 1988; Kim & Feldman, 1998). 
An adjustment of pension benefits has been 
the primary vehicle to induce retirement. 
Limiting research to this subsegment of the 
severance population does not represent 
the reality of today’s downsizing practices 
(Cascio & Wynn, 2004). Available severance 
packages now include lump-sum payments 
and post-employment educational support, in 
addition to the retirement-related incentives. 
There appear to be no studies that include 
employees who have been offered an array of 
severance choices that include options attrac-
tive to employees across all age and tenure 
levels. One study that has focused on incen-
tives for non-retirement-eligible employees 
has been Mehay and Hogan (1998), who 
assessed the effects of monetary incentives 
on the quit decisions of midcareer military 
personnel. Given these expanded sever-
ance choices, organizations must be able to 
predict the effectiveness of multiple sever-
ance options to improve human resource 
planning. Furthermore, having a holistic 
approach to severance options, as opposed to 
focusing on retirement- or near- retirement-
eligible employees, enables the organization 
to manage a diverse talent base. 
The purpose of this article is to address 
a gap in the literature by determining the 
economic, demographic, and psychographic 
characteristics of employees who accepted 
or rejected an array of severance options. We 
examined four options designed to induce 
blue-collar employees to sever their relation-
ships with the organization. The first option 
was a bonus offered to retirement-eligible 
employees to induce these individuals to retire 
(retirement-eligible incentive). The second 
option was a pre-retirement leave with pay 
offered to those employees who were within 
two years of retirement (paid- retirement 
furlough). The third option was limited to 
those employees age 55 or older with at least 
10 years of credited service. These individuals 
were offered their accrued pension benefits 
plus temporary benefits, payable until age 
62. However, because of the truncated years 
of service, the pensions for individuals in this 
group would be less than their full retirement 
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pensions (reduced-benefit retirement). The 
last option, extended to all employees, was 
a lump-sum payment in exchange for ter-
mination from the organization (lump-sum 
payment). 
Theoretical Framework
Image theory (Beach, 1993; Broughm & 
Walsh, 2007; Feldman, 1994), life-cycle the-
ory (Fields & Mitchell, 1984; Hogarth, 1988; 
Mehay & Hogan, 1998), and side-bet theory 
(Becker, 1960; Iverson & Buttigieg, 1999) have 
been used by researchers to explain an indi-
vidual’s retirement decision. 
Image theory has been proposed as a 
framework through which choice-decisions 
made by individuals contemplating separa-
tion from an organization can be explained. 
This theory maintains that individuals make 
decisions based on three considerations or 
images (Beach, 1993; Beach & Frederickson, 
1989; Feldman, 1994). The first image is the 
decision maker’s image of how people should 
behave (Beach, 1993). This image is based on 
the decision maker’s basic moral code, includ-
ing values, ethics, and behavioral norms 
(Beach, 1993; Beach & Frederickson, 1989). 
The second image is based on the decision 
maker’s image of what he/she envisions for 
the future (Beach, 1993; Beach & Frederickson, 
1989). The final image is the strategy the deci-
sion maker develops to achieve the image of 
his/her future (Beach, 1993). 
Generally, the image that an individual 
has for his/her future is to maintain a cer-
tain standard of living and have the abil-
ity to engage in valued activities (Feldman, 
1994). According to image theory, the deci-
sion to accept a severance option is screened 
against the individual’s moral code and this 
image (Beach, 1993). If the option is compat-
ible with this image and is consistent with 
the individual’s moral code, the option is 
likely to be accepted. Because it is difficult to 
imagine a situation in which acceptance of a 
severance package would create a moral con-
flict, recent research guided by image theory 
has focused on concepts other than those 
associated with a moral code (e.g., Broughm 
& Walsh, 2007).
This image of maintaining a certain stan-
dard of living is also consistent with the 
premise of life-cycle theory. Life-cycle theory 
is a basic economic model providing that “a 
utility maximizing individual will, among 
other things, consider the present value of 
earning and retirement income to estimate 
the value of working another year versus 
retiring” (Hogarth, 1988, p. 22). 
Side-bet theory also has been used to 
explain individual retirement decisions 
(Cho & Huang, 2012). This theory is based 
on the idea that individuals attach them-
selves to organizations because 
of an increased investment made 
to the organization over a period 
of time (Becker, 1960; Iverson & 
Buttigieg, 1999). As these invest-
ments increase, commitment to 
the organization also increases 
due to the unwillingness of indi-
viduals to lose investments in pen-
sion funds, organization-specific 
knowledge, and seniority (Iverson 
& Buttigieg, 1999; Mathieu & 
Zajac, 1990). When individuals 
have sufficient assets to retire, 
including pension assets, the side-
bet theory is no longer relevant 
because these individuals are able 
to recoup their investments at 
retirement. Early-retirement pro-
grams reduce the need for side-bets and accel-
erate the retirement decision. 
The following hypotheses have been 
developed relying on life-cycle theory, image 
theory, and side-bet theory as explanations 
for retirement behaviors. 
Hypotheses
Financial Stability 
The belief in a stable financial future greatly 
influences the decision to retire (Bahrami, 
1999; Kim & Feldman, 1998). Image theory 
suggests that individuals are more willing to 
retire if they believe they are able to maintain 
their standard of living and have the finan-
cial ability to engage in valued activities (Feld-
man & Turnley, 1995). Life-cycle theory 
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( Hogarth, 1988) predicts that based on accu-
mulated wealth and anticipated retirement 
income, individuals have an idea of the opti-
mal age at which this retirement decision will 
occur. Research also shows that this optimal 
age will be lowered if individuals are offered a 
severance option that increases retirement 
benefits (Hogarth, 1988; Kim & Feldman, 
1998). Based on this research, if an individual 
believes that the severance option will pro-
vide for a stable financial future, the person is 
likely to accept an incentive to retire. 
This evaluation of a stable financial future 
is equally likely even if the next step in the 
person’s career is not retirement. Researchers 
have noted a push process in which work 
and/or life stressors cause employees to 
generate and evaluate alternatives (Bretz, 
Boudreau, & Judge, 1994). Unacceptable lev-
els of these stressors will cause individuals to 
consider these alternatives (Bretz et al., 1994). 
Organizational stressors include perceptions 
of the organization, compensation levels, 
and perceived internal promotional opportu-
nities (Bretz et al., 1994; Lee & Mitchell, 1994; 
Mobley, Griffeth, Hand, & Meglino, 1979). All 
of these become salient in organizations that 
downsize (Devine, Reay, Stainton, & Collins-
Nakai, 2003). Under these circumstances, 
these individuals are pushed to generate 
and evaluate alternative job opportunities. 
Severance options incentivize individuals to 
accept a job alternative that is perceived 
to provide a stable financial future. 
Hypothesis 1: The belief that a severance option 
will provide a stable fi nancial future is positively 
related to the decision to accept a severance option. 
Future Employment
The availability of future employment re-
duces the uncertainty associated with leaving 
a current job. For those employees who are 
close to retirement and question whether 
they will have the resources to have a com-
fortable retirement, the availability of other 
employment may compensate for reduced re-
tirement income (Feldman & Turnley, 1995; 
Kim & Feldman, 1998). Furthermore, post-
separation employment reduces job-loss 
 anxiety by providing structure to the retiree’s 
life (Feldman & Turnley, 1995; Kim & Feld-
man, 1998). Kim and Feldman (1998) found 
that individuals who were planning on re-
turning to part-time teaching positions at a 
large university were more likely to accept 
early retirement. 
Employees who are offered a severance 
option generally work for employers who 
choose to downsize for a variety of reasons, 
including financial pressures, global com-
petition, technological advancements, out-
sourcing, mergers, and/or business process 
reengineering (Koeber & Wright, 2006). 
From an image theory perspective (Feldman, 
1994), future employment at these organiza-
tions is uncertain. Individuals not eligible for 
retirement may view the available severance 
options as opportunities to transition to job 
alternatives. This is consistent with previous 
research on voluntary turnover, in which 
an individual’s perceived ease of movement 
in the job market correlates with voluntary 
turnover (Bluedorn, 1982; Smith, Holtom, & 
Mitchell, 2011; Steel & Griffeth, 1989). 
Hypothesis 2: Availability of other employment is 
positively related to the decision to accept a sever-
ance option. 
Expectations of Future Offers
Research supports the premise that if an em-
ployee believes that a better retirement offer 
will be available at a later date, the employee 
will turn down the offer (e.g., Kim & Feld-
man, 1998; Pencavel, 2001). From a life-cycle 
theory perspective, this is a basic economic 
decision that seeks to maximize future in-
come (Hogarth, 1988). As long as future 
income will be maximized, individuals will 
be likely to take any of the severance options. 
Hypothesis 3: A belief that better offers will not be 
available in the future is positively related to the 
decision to accept a severance option. 
Age
Age is related to pension eligibility and as 
such is a predictor of retirement (Adams & 
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Beerh, 1998). Pension eligibility reduces the 
financial constraints associated with retire-
ment (Adams & Beerh, 1998). Research re-
ports a positive relationship between age and 
acceptance of retirement options (Hardy & 
Hazelrigg, 1999; Hogarth, 1988; Karoly & 
Rogowski, 1994; Kim & Feldman, 1998; 
Whelan, Ehrenberg, Hallock, & Seeber, 2011). 
According to side-bet theory (Becker, 1960; 
Cho & Huang, 2012), for those eligible for or 
nearing eligibility for retirement, the finan-
cial incentives associated with these options 
further reduce the financial risks associated 
with retirement. 
However, age also has been shown to 
be negatively related to turnover (Adams 
& Beerh, 1998). As people age, they are less 
likely to voluntarily leave their jobs because 
of maturity and family responsibilities (Steers, 
1977). It also is argued that as people age, 
available work options become more limited 
(Adams & Beerh, 1998). Due to these limited 
job opportunities, older individuals not eli-
gible for retirement are unlikely to accept a 
severance option that is perceived to be insuf-
ficient to manage family responsibilities over 
the long term. 
Hypothesis 4a: Age is positively related to the deci-
sion to accept either the retirement-eligible incen-
tive or the paid-retirement furlough.
Hypothesis 4b: Age is negatively related to the de-
cision to accept either the reduced-benefi t retire-
ment or lump-sum payment. 
Years of Service
Organizational tenure also has been found to 
be negatively related to turnover (Van Breu-
kelen, Van Der Vlist, & Steensma, 2004; 
Whelan et al., 2011). Tenure is associated 
with a reduced desire to leave the organiza-
tion or the inability to do so (Van Breukelen 
et al., 2004). This reduced desire can be ex-
plained by side-bet theory (Becker, 1960; 
 Iverson & Buttigieg, 1999). As tenure in-
creases, individuals are less motivated to leave 
an organization due to their financial and 
emotional investments (Cho & Huang, 2012; 
 Iverson & Buttigieg, 1999; Mathieu & Zajac, 
1990). An offer to leave the organization that 
does not provide for the recoupment of these 
investments is not likely to be accepted. 
However, when individuals have suffi-
cient assets to retire, including pension assets, 
the side-bet theory is no longer relevant 
because these individuals are able to recoup 
their investments at retirement. In this 
instance, a severance option that includes 
financial incentives for full retirement makes 
tenure even less relevant (Becker, 1960).
Hypothesis 5a: Tenure is positively related to the 
decision to accept either the retirement-eligible in-
centive or the paid-retirement furlough.
Hypothesis 5b: Tenure is negatively related to the 
decision to accept either the reduced-benefi t retire-
ment or lump-sum payment. 
Wage Level
Wage level is differentially related to the de-
cision to retire (Adams & Beerh, 1998). Life-
cycle theory states that a key decision facing 
individuals is whether they are in a finan-
cial position to retire (Hogarth, 1988). 
Higher-wage individuals should be in a bet-
ter financial position to retire than lower-
wage individuals (Adams & Beerh, 1998). A 
severance option that provides increased fi-
nancial incentives to retire is an added 
reason for these individuals to leave the 
organization. 
Research has found a weak relationship 
between low pay and turnover (Griffeth, 
Hom, & Gaertner, 2000). However, a financial 
incentive to quit should strengthen this rela-
tionship as it provides an additional incentive 
for lower-paid employees to seek employment 
elsewhere to enhance their ability to achieve 
a stable financial future (Whelan et al., 2011). 
Hypothesis 6a: Hourly rate is positively related to 
the decision to accept either the retirement-eligible 
incentive or the paid-retirement furlough.
Hypothesis 6b: Hourly rate is negatively related to 
the decision to accept either the reduced-benefi t re-
tirement or lump-sum payment. 
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Working Partner
Retirement generally is a joint decision and is 
timed in such a manner that both partners 
retire at a similar time (Hogarth, 1988; Karoly 
& Rogowski, 1994; Kim & Feldman, 1998). A 
projected image for retirement is engagement 
in valued activities (Feldman, 1994). Having a 
working partner may limit the individual’s 
ability to engage in these activities. Therefore, 
individuals who are close to or eligible for full 
retirement and have a working partner are 
less likely to accept an option resulting in full 
retirement (Bahrami, 1999; Hallberg & Eklöf, 
2010; Hogarth, 1988; Karoly & Rogowski, 
1994; Kim & Feldman, 1998; Väre, 2006). 
For younger individuals, marriage is often 
associated with increased family responsibili-
ties (Adams & Beerh, 1998). As these responsi-
bilities grow, individuals become more reliant 
on the organization to meet these obligations 
and thus more committed to the organiza-
tion (Iverson & Buttigieg, 1999). However, a 
working partner who is able to shoulder part 
of this burden reduces reliance on the organi-
zation and increases the likelihood of accept-
ing a severance option. 
Hypothesis 7a: Having a working partner is nega-
tively related to the decision to accept either the 
retirement-eligible incentive or the paid-retirement 
furlough.
Hypothesis 7b: Having a working partner is posi-
tively related to the decision to accept either the 
reduced-benefi t retirement or lump-sum payment. 
Method
Sampling Frame 
The present study was part of a larger research 
project commissioned by a domestic manu-
facturer and its union to identify demo-
graphic, economic, and psychographic fac-
tors that predict union hourly workers’ 
acceptances of an array of separation options. 
According to the manufacturer, the same 
union had represented the organization’s 
hourly employees for over 70 years. This rela-
tionship had been generally cooperative, 
although there have been historical instances 
of animosity, in particular during the early 
years of the relationship. Hourly wages in this 
industry were more than 30 percent above 
the average manufacturing wage in the 
United States (Procon.org, 2009). This indus-
try offered some of the most generous bene-
fits packages in the manufacturing sector. The 
manufacturer, headquartered in the United 
States, is a global Fortune 100 company. At 
the time of this study, the manufacturer em-
ployed more than 70,000 union workers in 
North America. Beginning in the 1980s, the 
fortunes of this industry could be described as 
a cycle of boom and bust. Restructuring and 
downsizing, through layoffs and early-retire-
ment programs, became common. Significant 
competition from manufacturers based in Eu-
rope and Japan persistently had decreased the 
world market share of the North American 
sector of the industry. Furthermore, competi-
tion from Chinese and Korean manufacturers 
had exacerbated the decline in these manu-
facturers’ competitive positions in more re-
cent times. Financial analysts were predicting 
potential bankruptcies or takeovers for the 
major original equipment manufacturers and 
their supplier bases in this industry. As a mat-
ter of fact, in more recent times, the supplier 
base has experienced major bankruptcies. 
Arguably, high labor costs in the North Amer-
ican sector of the industry were considered to 
be an important cause of the industry’s 
decline in market share. 
The packages in this study consisted of four 
options described previously. The retirement-
eligible incentive provided a bonus about 
equal to three-fifths of the total yearly wages 
for the average worker. The paid- retirement 
furlough provided up to two years of pay for 
those close to retirement. The reduced-benefit 
package provided supplemental wages until 
the age of 62 to those who were at least 55 
years of age and had at least 10 years of ser-
vice. The last package provided a lump-sum 
payment equal to approximately two years’ 
wages to sever all ties with the organization. 
These packages were not equivalent in a strict 
monetary sense. The value of these packages 
was functions of the life circumstances of 
the employees. It is impossible to compare 
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the value a retirement-eligible employee 
placed on three-fifths of a year’s pay versus 
the value a less tenured individual placed on 
two years of pay, with no retirement benefits 
and a threat of layoff. 
Surveys were mailed to individuals who 
had been offered and asked to consider one of 
the options. Therefore, the sample included 
both active and former employees of the orga-
nization, the latter group consisting of those 
who had accepted one of the packages. The 
mailing list included the individuals’ names 
and home mailing addresses. The following 
actions were taken to promote participation 
and minimize bias:
1. The survey packet included a personalized 
cover letter that introduced the study, in-
dicated that it was sponsored by the 
manufacturer and its union, and con-
ducted by an academic institution. The 
letter detailed the potential value from the 
employees’ participation in the study in 
determining future actions by the manu-
facturer and union. The employee also 
was told that his/her responses were con-
fidential and anonymous. A prepaid post-
age return envelope was included with the 
survey, indicating the survey would be re-
turned to the academic institution. 
2. A follow-up card was sent 10 days after 
the initial mailing to remind the em-
ployee of the request for his/her participa-
tion. The follow-up card also included the 
name and telephone number of a contact 
person if a replacement survey was needed.
Instruments
The survey contained psychographic, eco-
nomic, and demographic items. Items as-
sessed included the belief that the package 
would provide a stable financial future, per-
ceptions about the employee’s ability to find 
another job, expectations that a better separa-
tion package would be offered in the future, 
anticipated support from spouses’ or partners’ 
incomes or employment, age, tenure, and 
hourly rate classification.
Two versions of the survey were con-
structed: one designed for active employees, 
those who had rejected the buyout, and 
the other designed for employees who had 
recently accepted one of the options. Content 
of the items on each survey was virtually the 
same, but the two instruments contained 
slight wording variations. For example, for 
active employees, the items assessing percep-
tions that the option would provide a stable 
financial future contained the future tense. 
For those who already had accepted one of 
the options, the items contained past tenses. 
Participants
In preparation for a companywide offer of the 
four packages, facilities in two North Ameri-
can cities were selected for a pilot study. The 
purpose of this pilot study was to estimate 
the number of employees who would 
accept the offer, as well as their characteris-
tics. All hourly union employees at the facili-
ties in these cities were offered the four 
 packages. For this part of the study, 189 for-
mer employees who had recently chosen one 
of the options were compared to 135 employ-
ees who had rejected the same packages. Data 
on these employees were available because 
the options had been offered at specific plants 
before offers were made to all employees of 
the organization. More males (86 percent) 
than females participated. The mean age of 
participants was between 50 and 54 years. 
Average tenure was between 20 and 24 years. 
All but 32 of the participants had completed 
at least a high school education. Those paid 
as unskilled workers (75 percent) outnum-
bered those paid as members of skilled trades. 
Approximately 65 percent of the participants 
worked on an assembly line.
The final response rate was 19 percent for 
this segment of the study. To assess nonre-
sponse bias, we compared the responses from 
the earliest respondents (first quartile) with 
those from the latest respondents (fourth 
quartile). There were no significant differences 
for the demographic variables (age, tenure, 
hourly wage, and partnered status) between 
the two groups. This analysis was based on the 
premise that late-wave respondents would be 
more similar to nonrespondents. Therefore, 
the respondent characteristics of the late 
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respondents were expected to be reasonably 
representative of nonrespondents (Armstrong 
& Overton, 1977). To further assess nonre-
sponse bias, procedures similar to those rec-
ommended by Lindner, Murphy, and Briers 
(2001) were employed. The independent 
variables associated with the hypotheses were 
regressed onto a variable representing the two 
groups: all those who responded before the 
reminder notice was sent and all those who 
responded after the reminder notice was sent. 
The results from this regression were not sig-
nificant (R2 = .01, F(7, 392) = .66, p > .05) 
providing evidence that at least among these 
two groups, responses did not differ. 
Data Analysis
Before administering the survey, summative 
scales were developed to represent percep-
tions about the likelihood of finding a re-
placement job, the level of partner support 
employees might expect, the adequacy of 
projected retirement income and/or stable fi-
nancial future, and the likelihood that a bet-
ter package would be offered in the future. 
Confirmatory factor analysis indicated 
acceptable levels of convergent and discrimi-
nant validity for the variables in the model. 
Average variances extracted (AVEs) ranged 
from .68 to .84, all above the minimum value 
of .50, indicating adequate discriminant valid-
ity (Bagozzi, Yi, & Phillips, 1991). Composite 
reliabilities assessed the internal consistency 
of the measures (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). 
These ranged from .71 to .84, all greater than 
the acceptable minimum value of .70 for 
these measures (Bagozzi et al., 1991). 
Following an approach recommended by 
Bagozzi et al. (1991), nested models of the cor-
relations among pairs of variables were com-
pared to further test discriminant  validity. 
A chi-square difference test determined 
whether the constrained and unconstra-
ined pairs of constructs significantly differed 
(Anderson & Gerbing, 1988). For all pairs, the 
unconstrained model, less one degree of free-
dom, indicated a chi-square of at least 3.84 
lower than that of the constrained model, 
indicating discriminant validities for all pairs 
(Anderson & Gerbing, 1988; Farrell, 2010). 
Ordered continuous variables provided 
measures for the independent variables of 
age and tenure. All independent variables 
were centered to minimize multicollinearity 
(Cohen, 1988; Edwards, 1957). Collinearity 
diagnostics were performed for the indepen-
dent variables. All variance inflation factor 
(VIF) measures were less than two, the cutoff 
considered to be the acceptable standard. 
Table I presents descriptions of the items 
and scales included in these analyses. Table II 
presents the correlations among independent 
variables.
Multinomial logistic regression tested the 
hypotheses for those who had selected one of 
the four options and those who rejected all 
options. Multinomial logistic regression is rec-
ommended for the analysis of data in which 
the dependent variable is ordinal, the multi-
ple independent variables are either categori-
cal or continuous, and their relationships are 
best represented by model-fitting procedures 
(Garson, 2009). Logistic regression, and, by 
extension, multinomial logistic regression, 
makes no assumptions about normality, lin-
earity, or equal variances within each group 
for independent variables in the log function 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996, p. 575 ). Because 
of these relaxations of assumptions in log 
functions, the procedure is relatively robust 
when analyzing groups with unequal sample 
sizes (Garson, 2009). 
This procedure tested the hypotheses 
for those who chose the retirement-eligible 
incentive, the paid-retirement furlough, the 
reduced-benefit retirement, and the lump-
sum payment versus those who had accepted 
none of the options, and chose to remain 
active employees of the organization. Active 
employees, those who had accepted none of 
the options, constituted the primary reference 
group for the tests of the hypotheses. Although 
not associated specifically with the hypoth-
eses, differences between pairs of groups other 
than those involving the active employee 
group also were of interest in this study. To 
assess all comparisons among all levels of the 
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dependent variable, the reference group was 
varied during four runs of the model. 
Multinomial regression requires mini-
mum numbers of responses for each inde-
pendent variable to minimize Type I errors 
(Garson, 2009). At least five cases are required 
for each independent variable within each 
dependent variable category. Tabachnick and 
Fidell (2001) suggest a heuristic for testing b 
coefficients in multinomial logistic regres-
sion: where m = number of independent vari-
ables, N must be greater than 104 + m. Other 
heuristics require at least 20 cases for each 
independent variable or 40 times the num-
ber of independent variables for the overall 
sample size (Garson, 2009). Our sample ful-
filled these heuristics, having 324 cases, 
seven independent variables, and at least 40 
cases for each of the five dependent variable 
categories. 
Results
The Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) and 
the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) indi-
cated that the model that included the inde-
pendent variables provided a significantly 
better fit to the data when compared to the 
model including the intercept only. Similarly, 
the Likelihood Ratio Tests were significant, 
χ2(28, N = 324) = 551.88, p < .001, indicating 
that the model containing the independent 
variables significantly improved explanation 
of the relationships in the data. Cox and 
Snell, Nagelkerke, and McFadden faux R2 sta-
tistics were .82, .87, and .58, respectively.
The classification hit rate indicated that 
74.6 percent of the cases were correctly clas-
sified. The proportional-by-chance-accuracy 
rate for the classification was 34 percent. The 
latter percentage represents the accuracy rate 
attributable to chance multiplied by 1.25. 
It is considered to be the minimum predic-
tive percentage for meaningful classification 
results (Garson, 2009). 
Active Employee Group as Referent
Individuals in the retirement-eligible incen-
tive group were more confident that they 
would have adequate retirement income (p < 
.01), were less likely to wait (p < .001), were 
older (p < .001), had more tenure (p < .001), 
and were less likely to have financial support 
from a partner (p < .01) than were those who 
rejected the offer and chose to stay. 
Individuals in the paid-retirement fur-
lough group, compared with those in the 
active employee group, were more likely to 
believe they would have adequate retirement 
income (p < .01), were less likely to believe 
that waiting was worthwhile (p < .001), had 
more tenure (p < .001), and held lower hourly 
wage jobs (p < .01). 
T A B L E  I I  Pearson Correlations Among Independent Variables
  1 2 3 4 5 6
1 Fstable 
2 Jobfi nd .310**
3 Wait −.140** −.115*
4 Partner .126* .144** .003
5 Age .133** −.040 .030 .176**
6 Tenure .271** .033 −.071 −.153** .671**
7 Hourly Rate −.103* .128*** .005 −.122* .210** .101*
n = 324.
*p < .05, **p < .01.
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By understanding 
the similarities and 
differences among 
the individuals 
who chose one 
of the severance 
options and those 
individuals who 
rejected all options, 
organizations may 
be able to predict 
and control the 
talent pool without 
resorting to forced 
layoffs.
Compared to those in the active employee 
group, individuals who chose the reduced-
benefit retirement option were more likely to 
state they could find alternate employment (p 
< .001), were less likely to believe that wait-
ing would be beneficial (p < .001), and were 
older (p < .001). 
Employees who accepted the lump-sum 
payment, compared to active employees, 
were more likely to believe they could find 
an alternative job (p < .001), disagreed that 
there was a benefit to waiting (p < .001), 
were younger (p < .05), had less tenure (p < 
.05), and were employed in lower-wage jobs 
(p = .001). 
Retirement-Eligible Incentive Group 
as Referent 
Employees from the paid-retirement furlough 
group were younger (p = .001), had less ten-
ure (p < .01), and had lower pay (p < .05) 
than those from the retirement-eligible in-
centive category. 
Compared to those in the retirement-
eligible incentive group, respondents in the 
lump-sum payment group had less confi-
dence about a stable financial future (p = .01), 
were younger (p < .001), had less tenure (p < 
.001), held lower-wage jobs (p < .05), and had 
greater partner support (p < .05).
Compared to the retirement-eligible 
incentive employees, the reduced-benefit 
retirement group respondents were more 
likely to see benefits in waiting (p < .01), be 
younger (p < .01), and have less tenure (p < 
.001). 
Paid-Retirement Furlough Group as 
Referent
Individuals in the reduced-benefit retirement 
group were more likely to believe it was better 
to wait (p < .05), were older (p = .001), had 
less tenure (p < .001), and held higher-wage 
jobs (p < .05) than those in the paid-retire-
ment furlough group. 
Respondents who accepted a lump-sum 
payment were more concerned about a sta-
ble financial future (p < .01) and reported 
less tenure (p < .001) than those in the paid-
retirement furlough group. 
Reduced-Benefi t Retirement Group 
as Referent 
When compared to reduced-benefit retire-
ment as the reference category, those who 
chose the lump-sum payment were less likely 
to see the benefit of waiting (p < .001), were 
younger (p < .001), had less tenure (p < .01), 
and held lower-wage jobs (p < .05). 
Tables III through VI present the results 
from the multinomial logistic regressions, 
including the B coefficients, standard errors, 
odds ratios, and confidence inter-
vals for the four models. 
Discussion
In our opinion, the main contri-
bution this study makes to sever-
ance options research is the com-
parisons of the characteristics of 
those who accepted one of the 
options and those who rejected 
all offers. Moreover, our study 
allowed the comparisons of indi-
viduals who accepted four 
 distinctly different alternatives, 
two of them not resulting in full 
retirement. By understanding the 
similarities and differences among 
the individuals who chose one of 
the severance options and those 
individuals who rejected all op-
tions, organizations may be able 
to predict and control the talent 
pool without resorting to forced 
layoffs. The following discussion 
addresses similarities and differ-
ences among these groups. 
Stable Financial Future
Hypothesis 1 was partially supported. Indi-
viduals in both the retirement-eligible incen-
tive and the paid-retirement furlough groups 
were more likely to believe they would 
have a  stable financial future than were the 
254 HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, MARCH–APRIL 2013
Human Resource Management DOI: 10.1002/hrm
T A B L E  I I I  Multinomial Logistic Regression for Variables on Choices: Active Employee as Referent
B SE OR







Fstable .67** .26 1.97 1.18 3.29
Jobfi nd .38 .25 1.47 .90 2.41
Wait −1.18*** .21 .30 .20 .46
Age 1.77*** .41 5.91 2.67 13.08
Tenure 2.01*** .35 7.53 3.79 14.97
Hourly Rate −.16 .77 .85 .19 3.84





Fstable .63** .24 1.89 1.19 3.01
Jobfi nd .31 .20 1.36 .92 2.02
Wait −.94*** .17 .39 .28 .55
Age −.39 .28 .67 .39 1.16
Tenure 1.08*** .21 2.95 1.98 4.41
Hourly Rate −2.50** .87 .08 .02 .45




Fstable −.18 .24 .83 .52 1.32
Jobfi nd .67*** .18 1.96 1.39 2.76
Wait −1.41*** .22 .24 .16 .37
Age −.36* .18 .70 .49 .99
Tenure −.76* .30 .46 .26 .84
Hourly Rate −2.43** .76 .09 .02 .39





Fstable .33 .18 1.40 .98 2.00
Jobfi nd .51** .16 1.68 1.24 2.27
Wait −.61*** .14 .54 .41 .71
Age .59*** .17 1.81 1.31 2.51
Tenure .16 .12 1.17 .94 1.47
Hourly Rate −.44 .46 .64 .26 1.57
Partner −.16 .13 .85 .66 1.08
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
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T A B L E  I V   Multinomial Logistic Regression for Variables on Choices: Retirement-Eligible Incentive as 
Referent
B SE OR






Fstable −.04 .23 .96 .61 1.50
Jobfi nd −.07 .24 .93 .58 1.47
Wait .24 .19 1.28 .88 1.86
Age −2.17*** .44 .11 .05 .27
Tenure −.93** .35 .39 .20 .78
Hourly Rate −2.34* .95 .10 .02 .62




Fstable −.86** .33 .42 .22 .81
Jobfi nd .28 .29 1.33 .76 2.32
Wait −.22 .29 .80 .45 1.40
Age −2.13*** .44 .12 .05 .28
Tenure −2.78*** .46 .06 .03 .15
Hourly Rate −2.26* 1.04 .10 .01 .79




Fstable −.34 .24 .71 .44 1.14
Jobfi nd .12 .24 1.14 .71 1.83
Wait .57** .20 1.78 1.21 2.64
Age −1.18** .40 .31 .14 .67
Tenure −1.85*** .35 .16 .08 .31
Hourly Rate −.28 .75 .75 .18 3.25
Partner .39 .21 1.48 .99 2.22
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
individuals who rejected the options. These 
results are explainable by the fact that indi-
viduals in both these groups had already 
reached or were close to receiving full retire-
ment benefits.
Other findings indicated that individu-
als in the lump-sum payment group were less 
likely to believe the package would provide 
a stable financial future than were those in 
the retirement-eligible incentive and paid-
retirement furlough groups. A possible expla-
nation for these findings might be that for 
individuals in the lump-sum payment group, 
the lump-sum payment represented more of 
a short-term fix, rather than a guarantee of a 
stable financial future. 
Job Find 
Hypothesis 2, relating to the availability of a 
comparable job, was partially supported. 
Compared to the individuals in the active 
employee group, those who chose the re-
duced-benefit retirement and lump-sum 
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T A B L E  V  Multinomial Logistic Regression for Variables on Choices: Paid Retirement Furlough as Referent
95% Confi dence 
Interval for OR




Fstable −.821* .31 .44 .24 .81
Jobfi nd .36 .24 1.44 .91 2.28
Wait −.47 .25 .62 .38 1.02
Age .03 .31 1.04 .56 1.91
Tenure −1.85*** .35 .16 .08 .31
Hourly Rate .07 1.09 1.08 .13 9.20




Fstable −.30 .22 .74 .48 1.14
Jobfi nd .20 .20 1.23 .83 1.82
Wait .33* .16 1.39 1.01 1.92
Age .99** .29 2.70 1.53 4.77
Tenure −.92*** .20 .40 .27 .59
Hourly Rate 2.06** .85 7.86 1.47 41.88
Partner .14 .17 1.16 .82 1.62
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
T A B L E  V I   Multinomial Logistic Regression for Variables on Choices: Reduced Benefi t Retirement as 
Referent
B SE OR
95% Confi dence 
Interval for OR
Lower Upper
Lump-Sum Payment Intercept −2.38** .75
Fstable −.51 .27 .60 .35 1.01
Jobfi nd .15 .20 1.17 .79 1.73
Wait −.80*** .23 .45 .28 .70
Age −.95*** .23 .38 .25 .60
Tenure −.92** .31 .40 .22 .73
Hourly Rate −1.98* .81 .14 .03 .68
Partner .15 .15 1.17 .86 1.58
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
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 payment options were more likely to believe 
that they could find comparable employ-
ment. This was as predicted. In our reasoning, 
both of these groups faced difficult economic 
decisions. Those in the reduced-benefit group 
lacked the combination of age and tenure to 
earn full retirement benefits and faced poten-
tial layoff. Those in the lump-sum group also 
did not have sufficient age and tenure to re-
tire and faced a greater likelihood of layoff. 
The packages offered to the individuals in 
these two groups would not outweigh the 
costs of giving up a job with high wages and 
good benefits unless they believed they could 
find comparable employment elsewhere. 
Hypothesis 2 was not supported with 
respect to the paid-retirement furlough group 
and the retirement-eligible incentive group. 
A possible explanation for these results is that 
those individuals who took the respective 
packages believed that they would not need 
to find a comparable job because the firm 
offered generous retirement packages. 
Wait
As hypothesized (Hypothesis 3), those who 
accepted any of the four options were more 
likely to believe that a better offer was not 
forthcoming when compared to the active 
employee group. In findings from the regres-
sions comparing groups that accepted the of-
fers, individuals in the reduced-benefit retire-
ment group were most likely to believe that a 
better offer was forthcoming when compared 
to the individuals in the retirement-eligible 
incentive, paid-retirement furlough, and 
lump-sum payment groups. 
Age
Hypothesis 4a was partially supported. Indi-
viduals in the retirement-eligible incentive 
group were older than the individuals in the 
active employee group. The opportunity to 
receive a bonus and full retirement was avail-
able to only older individuals. In our opinion, 
the retirement-eligible incentive added the 
needed financial incentive to motivate retire-
ment augmenting this group’s image of a sta-
ble financial future. 
Hypothesis 4b was supported with respect 
to the lump-sum payment group, which 
included the individuals with the lowest aver-
age age of all groups. Opposite to our predic-
tions, age was positively associated with the 
decision to accept the reduced-benefit retire-
ment option. We believe this result is related 
to the requirement that this group be at least 
50 years old. As such, they tended to be older 
than those who rejected the offer. In addition, 
as individuals age, jobs requiring manual 
labor and long hours become less attractive. 
Tenure
Hypothesis 5a was supported. For those indi-
viduals who accepted the retirement-eligible 
incentive and the paid-retirement furlough, 
organizational tenure was higher than that of 
those who rejected all offers. 
Hypothesis 5b was partially supported. 
The individuals who chose the lump-sum 
payment had less organizational tenure than 
those who rejected the offers. Compared to 
the active employee group, these individuals 
had fewer investments in the organization, 
such as pension benefits. 
Hourly Rate
Hourly rate was negatively associated with the 
probability that an individual would accept 
the lump-sum payment option, confirming 
Hypothesis 6b. Opposite to our prediction 
(Hypothesis 6a), the individuals who accepted 
the paid-retirement furlough also had lower 
hourly rates than those who rejected the offers. 
In this work situation, lower pay was associ-
ated with assembly-line jobs. Reasonably, these 
jobs require more manual labor and unappeal-
ing working conditions, thereby making them 
less attractive than higher-paid skilled jobs. 
Working Partner
A working partner was predicted to affect the 
choice to accept or reject an offer contingent 
upon the life circumstances of the employees. 
Partially supporting Hypothesis 7a, individu-
als in the retirement-eligible incentive group 
were less likely to have a working partner 
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The array of 
severance packages 
compared in 





than those in the active employee group. Re-
search (e.g., Hallberg & Eklöf, 2010; Hogarth, 
1988; Kim & Feldman, 1998; Väre, 2006) has 
shown that retirement is often a coordinated 
activity between partners, and, in this case, 
the retirement bonus might have only moti-
vated those who did not have significant co-
ordination issues with a partner to leave. 
Among nonhypothesized findings, those 
employees who chose the lump-sum pay-
ment, the youngest group, were more likely 
to have a working partner than were those 
in the retirement-eligible incentive group. 
Because younger individuals are more likely 
to have family and financial responsibili-
ties (Adams & Beerh, 1998), we interpret the 
choice of the lump-sum payment 
to be related to the presence of the 
financial buffer of another income 
in the household. 
Implications for Practice
Our findings will help organiza-
tions to manage their talent bases 
(Cascio & Wynn, 2004). By under-
standing the demographic, 
 economic, and psychographic 
characteristics that differentiate in-
dividuals who reject and accept an 
array of packages, the organization 
can proactively structure its sever-
ance options. By having an array of options, 
organizations can predict and create the talent 
mix that they require for the future. Histori-
cally, downsizing has entailed either buying 
out senior employees or laying off junior 
 employees. The array of severance packages 
compared in this study offers flexibility to or-
ganizations pursuing a downsizing strategy. 
We believe the unique implications 
from our study are related to the decisions 
of the reduced-benefit retirement and the 
lump-sum payment groups. These are 
the individuals who have their expectations 
of retirement and a stable financial future 
most disrupted. Not only were they presented 
with the options with the least promise of 
future stability, but they also faced the great-
est possibility of permanent layoff. For both 
of these groups, the beliefs that they would 
be able to replace their current jobs with com-
parable ones were critical to their decisions to 
accept the offer. Because of relatively high 
wage rates in this industry, comparable pay-
ing jobs for these manufacturing employees 
are rare. If organizations realistically expect 
these less tenured individuals to leave, they 
must prepare them for jobs requiring more 
sophisticated skills and offer job-placement 
services. Offering training and education pro-
grams to develop skills (e.g., technological, 
managerial, and entrepreneurial) that would 
transfer to other industries would increase the 
chances that these individuals would accept 
an offer. As added bonuses for organizations, 
these skills and abilities would create a work-
force proficient in the newest technologies 
and entrepreneurial techniques. 
From our results, the message to organi-
zations anticipating downsizing is to be con-
sistent. Individuals who accepted any of the 
options were less likely to believe that bet-
ter offers were forthcoming. In this industry, 
many employees have been through its eco-
nomic cycles and have experienced downsiz-
ings in the past. The expectation that more 
or better offers would be forthcoming is part 
of the corporate culture. Regardless, organiza-
tions should pursue a strategy of describing 
the current offer, as well as the immediate 
consequences if severance targets are not met. 
Short-term consequences for those who do 
not accept the package should be described 
before the offers are made and, of course, 
implemented, if warranted. 
In general, the results of this study per-
taining to the full retirement options repli-
cate those of previous research on the effects 
of age, tenure, and financial stability. Because 
much of this research was conducted in the 
1980s and 1990s, our results infer that indi-
vidual decisions to retire are affected by simi-
lar factors today. Decisions to accept any of 
the options were generally made consistent 
with the individual’s image of maintaining a 
certain standard of living (Feldman, 1994). 
Research Limitations
We studied one organization, and our find-
ings may not be generalizable to other 
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Certainly, larger 
sample sizes would 
allow the number 
of independent 
variables to be 
increased, as 
well as add to the 
statistical power of 
the analyses.
 organizations. Then again, multiple depart-
ments and facilities in the pilot cities of the 
organization were included in the study. Ac-
complishing multi-organizational research 
may not be feasible because organizations 
downsize in unique ways, through different 
programs and incentives. 
From a measurement perspective, most 
scales were developed from fewer than the 
recommended four to six items. The study 
was funded by the organization and its 
union, with the goal of collecting significant 
amounts of information from the survey. The 
sponsors limited the number of items on 
the survey. They also wanted specific informa-
tion that often did not correspond with previ-
ously validated research scales. Despite these 
constraints, all variables met minimal stan-
dards from a measurement model perspective. 
We acknowledge that there may be 
a problem associated with a 19 percent 
response rate. On the other hand, this study 
represented a unique opportunity to obtain 
data from an organization that was intended 
to be used for guidance for upcoming sev-
erance offers. The data met standards that 
have historically been utilized to assess non-
response bias. 
Finally, our study is limited to one orga-
nization located in the United States. In the 
United States, when an employee rejects 
a severance package, he/she significantly 
increases the risk of his/her layoff. However, 
this is not true in all countries. Governments 
in some countries can block layoffs not pre-
viously approved by governmental agencies 
(e.g., the Netherlands, Japan, Korea, and 
China) (Dowling, 2009). In addition, the 
European Union requires consultation with 
employees and additional obligations, such 
as retraining beyond severance compensa-
tion (Dowling, 2009). Without the threat of 
layoff or with the presence of social safety 
nets, workers in the United States might 
choose differently.
Suggestions for Future Research
Recently, severance options have been similar 
across organizations within an industry. Or-
ganizations in the same industry offering 
similar arrays of packages might provide op-
portunities for multi-organizational research. 
Certainly, larger sample sizes would allow the 
number of independent variables to be in-
creased, as well as add to the statistical power 
of the analyses. 
Future studies might compare differ-
ent categories of employees from the same 
organization’s workforce. Differences among 
blue-collar, white-collar, technical, clerical, 
and professional workers and their reactions 
to separation packages have not 
been identified. Also, no research 
has compared the influence of 
defined-benefit plans versus 
defined-contributions plans on 
employee willingness to accept 
a severance offer. By expanding 
the scope of research in this area, 
organizations may be provided 
with better guidance about how to 
achieve optimal employee mixes 
in a downsizing situation. 
Furthermore, cognitive disso-
nance (Festinger, 1964) may have 
affected our results. Individuals 
who accepted or rejected packages 
likely had conflicting thoughts 
and beliefs about what was a life-changing 
decision. Future research should consider 
longitudinal research that would investigate 
pre- and post-decision cognitive processes. 
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